In 
Introduction
Due to the fast progress of computer networks and Internet, information technology is used in electronic commerce. Electronic payment is one of the key issues of electronic commerce development. To realize the digitalization of traditional cash, in 1983, Chaum suggested the first electronic cash scheme [1] . Popularly, in an electronic cash scheme, there are three participants, the bank, the spender and the merchant. First, a spender opens an account in a bank. Then, he withdraws electronic cash from his account and pays it to a merchant. After checking the electronic cash"s validity, the merchant accepts it and deposits it to the bank. For security and efficiency, there are a number of requirements for electronic cash scheme, such as, anonymity, unforgeability, unreusability, date attachability, divisibility, transferability and portability [2] . Some of them are listed below:
Anonymity: The spender of a cash must be anonymous. As long as the coin is spent legitimately, neither the merchant nor the bank can identify the spender of the coin.
Unforgeability: Only authorized banks can generate electronic cash. Unreusability: The electronic cash cannot be reused. The scheme can detect the malicious spenders, who spend the cash twice. Date attachability: Electronic cash must embody the dates of withdrawing, paying and depositing. These dates can are used to check the expiration date and charge for interest.
Electronic cash schemes can be divided into two categories: online and off-line. In online schemes, as paying a coin to a merchant, the bank must attend to validate the coin and detect its reuse. But, in off-line schemes, double spending can only be figured out when the merchant deposits the coin to the bank in the next phase. After Chaum"s scheme, a lot of electronic cash schemes [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] have been proposed based on blind signature and restrictive blind signature [9] . Afterward, many more complex schemes have been proposed [10] [11] [12] [13] . Recently, Eslami and Talebi proposed an untraceable electronic cash scheme [2] and claimed that their scheme satisfies all main security requirements, such as, anonymity, unreusability and date attachability. However, Baseri, et al., [14] showed that Eslami and Talebi"s scheme is subjected to some weaknesses in perceptibility of double spender, unforgeability and date attachability. Baseri, et al., also contributed an electronic cash scheme and claimed that their scheme is immune to the weaknesses of Eslami and Talebi"s scheme. But, as we show in this paper, Baseri, et al.,"s scheme is suffering from some faults in anonymity, expiration date and merchant frauds. To improve Baseri, et al.,"s scheme, we also propose a new untraceable off-line electronic cash scheme. The new scheme not only possesses the features, such as anonymity, unforgeability, unreusability, but also possesses the feature of avoiding merchant frauds.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Some basic concepts are introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, we review Baseri, et al.,"s scheme and show its weaknesses. In Section 4 we propose a new electronic cash scheme. Security analysis of our scheme is covered in Section 5. Performance comparisons are shown in Section 6. We finally conclude in Section 7.
Preliminaries

RSA Cryptosystem
A RSA cryptosystem [15] 
Blind Signatures
In 1983, Chaum proposed a blind signature scheme [1] based on the RSA cryptosystem. Blind signatures can be applied to preserve the anonymity of users against leaking user information to the signer, such as, in electronic cash payment and electronic voting schemes. A typical blind signature scheme involves two participants: a signer and a signature requester. The signature requester need the signature of the signer on one message m . But the requester does not wish to leak the content of m to the signer. Hence, the requester chooses a random number b as a blinding factor and sends e bm ( e is the signer"s public key in RSA cryptosystem) to the signer. The signer computes () 
Baseri et al.'s Scheme and its Failures
In this section, we first review Baseri et al."s scheme [14] . Then we show its failures.
Baseri, et al.,'s scheme
There are four participants in the scheme: a Central Authority, the Bank, the Spender and the Merchant. The scheme contains five phases: initialization, withdrawal, payment, deposit and exchange.
Initialization:
In this phase, the central authority should set some public parameters. There parameters include two publicly known elements, 1 
Opening an Account:
To open an account, the customer should identify himself to the bank. Authenticating the customer, the bank stores his identity information in its account database. This process is done in the following steps.
Step 1 O to the customer.
3. Withdrawal:
Before withdrawing and asking for a coin, the spender should prove his/her ownership of the account to the bank. The spender should prove his identity in a similar way to the withdrawal of classical cash from an account (i.e., by offering his passport or driving license). In addition, he should refer to a bulletin board in which the bank periodically publishes the fresh time by two parameters, t and (mod ( ))  , 2  , t to the bank.
Step O to the spender.
Step 3. The spender S: 
Payment:
When the spender wants to spend his coin at the shop, the following steps are done:
Step 1. The spender S:
Step 
Deposit:
In this phase, the following process is done between the bank B and the merchant M:
Step 1. The merchant M:
Sends the transcript of each electronic coin (i.e. Coin , 1 r , 2 r ) to the bank.
Step 2. The bank B: (a) Checks the authenticity of the merchant and verifies the transcript of the received coin.
(b) Checks whether the coin exists in its deposit or exchange tables or not. If the coin exists, it runs the double spender detection procedure, else, accepts the coin, stores it in the deposit table and transfers money to the merchant. 
3.1.6 Exchange: In this phase, referring to the bank, the customer can exchange his old coin (which is not outdated) with new coins and update the expiration date of his own coin. To control the size of its database, this affair is undertaken by the following procedure:
Step 1. The customer:
(a) Offers his coin, besides his identity, to the bank. 
Weaknesses of Baseri, et al.,'s scheme
In this subsection, we show some weaknesses of Baseri et al."s scheme. 
First Fault: Attacking Expiration
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The Proposed Scheme
To overcome the weaknesses of Baseri, et al.,"s scheme, we proposed an improved electronic cash scheme. In our scheme there are also four participants: a Central Authority, the Bank, the Spender and the Merchant and the improved scheme contains five phases: initialization, withdrawal, payment, deposit and exchange. Initialization, deposit and exchange are as same as that of Baseri, et al.,"s scheme. Here we only describe the withdrawal and payment phases.
Withdrawal phase
To withdrawing and asking for a coin O to the spender.
Step 3 
Anonymity
In the first place, while obtaining the signatures 2 t . It reveals no information to the attacker.
Double Spender Detection
In the case that a spender spends a coin twice or more, the identity information of the malicious spender can be obtained from the equations: 
Unforgeability
If an adversary intends to forge a coin 
Performance Comparison
Baseri, et al., compared their scheme with some other related scheme [2, 12, 16] . The comparison showed that Baseri, et al.,"s scheme cost less computation time. But we show Baseri, et al.,"s scheme is subjected to some weaknesses. For developing immunity from attacks, we propose a new scheme. Here we just compare our scheme with Baseri, et al.,"s scheme. Compared with Baseri, et al.,"s scheme, the new scheme just increases two modular multiplications in withdrawal phase and payment phase, respectively. But our scheme is more secure. So, from security and efficiency, our scheme needs less computation and communication costs.
Conclusion
Electronic payment is one of the key issues of electronic commerce development. Electronic cash is special electronic payment. There are a number of requirements for secure electronic cash schemes, such as, anonymity, unforgeability, unreusability, date attachability, divisibility, transferability and portability. In this paper, we show Baseri, et al.,"s electronic cash scheme is suffering from some weaknesses in anonymity, expiration date and merchant frauds. To improve Baseri, et al.,"s scheme, we propose a new off-line electronic cash scheme. We also discuss the security properties of our scheme, such as, anonymity, double spender detection and unforgeability. It is worthy to be mentioned that the new scheme not only possesses the features, such as anonymity, unforgeability, unreusability, but also possesses the feature of avoiding merchant frauds.
